economic rights robust is a seeming departure from, and indeed stands in tension with, the populist project in his earlier works. 4 The tension is most striking where Professor Tushnet, known as a strong critic of judicial review as it is performed in the U.S., suggests that judicial review, albeit in a different form, might be beneficial for ensuring the enforcement of socio-economic rights. Indeed, Professor Tushnet argues that to maintain "strong" socio-economic rights we need "weak" courts. The surprising twist, of course, is that we still need courts. And we still need judicial review.
Although this book offers a seemingly different and opposing conceptual framework from his previous work, the two may perhaps be reconciled as a case of political pragmatism. Ideally, Tushnet argues, if we were to design a constitution from scratch, we should not provide for judicial review. 5 However, given that we already live in a system with judicial review, a feature unlikely to disappear, the question is how to design it so that it will, first, meet objections from principles of democratic self government, 6 and, second, how to design it so that it will be an effective tool in promoting rights, in this case socio-economic rights. 7 A different, but complementary, reading of this book is that Tushnet takes this opportunity to respond to those who agreed with his diagnosis in "Taking the Constitution Away" -that courts should not 4 See, e.g., Mark 7 By socio-economic rights I mean the group of positive rights such as rights to housing, healthcare and education. Those are also called second generation rights, to distinguish them from first generation civil and political rights. As will be detailed below, Tushnet is not putting forth a normative argument that we should promote these rights.
have judicial supremacy in interpreting constitutions -but criticized him for failing to elaborate exactly how the legislature and the people should perform the interpretative function. 8 This review will outline Professor Tushnet's argument and argue that two preconditions must be met for the new kind of judicial review to succeed. Following that, I will attempt to situate this work with Tushnet's previous work in constitutional theory, and argue that despite the seeming tension the two are compatible.
B. Summary of Book

I. On Doing Comparative Constitutional Law
Professor Tushnet begins his book by making an argument for the usefulness of comparative constitutional law. This serves as a helpful reminder that the current controversy in the U.S. over the use of comparative law in constitutional interpretation has taken on exaggerated and politicized overtones. 9 Tushnet points out, and rightfully so, that looking at foreign constitutional law, aside from the pure intellectual interest, may be helpful when we encounter a new problem where there is no settled precedent. To be sure, the comparativist must exercise caution when 8 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 215 (2000) . 9 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Much has been written in the past few years about weak form review. 21 The initial hope that weak form mechanisms will deliver real-time inter-branch dialogue has turned into skepticism that such dialogue can exist, let alone be ascertained. 22 Less skeptical commentators argue that, at best, such dialogue happens only infrequently.
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The main concern here is that weak form review is unstable, turning into strong form review, thus bringing back the same democratic tensions familiar from the U.S.
context. On this view, weak form review does not seem promising. areas where the law isn't established enough, in a general system of strong form review. Therefore, one should view the transformation from weak form to strong form as the reflection of a people on their constitutional commitments.
But an important question, I think, remains. Even if democratic objections are mitigated when the people decide to transfer their rights to the judiciary, what if the people change their minds? It seems then that even if an "experiment has ended" we would need a mechanism which will allow for its reexamination. In other words, strong form review should never be too strong so as to preclude us from revising an existing legal arrangement.
IV. The Sameness of Socio-Economic Rights
Systems of weak form review purport to designate a larger role for legislatures in constitutional interpretation because the institutional mechanisms permit input after a judicial decision. 27 However, it is clear that the original motivation behind weak form review was not to enhance the status of socio-economic rights. In order to make that connection, Tushnet needs to preempt another argument, that courts should not enforce such rights in the first place. Enter the state action doctrine. 28 The state action doctrine, which requires that in order for there to be a justiciable action the claim must be brought against a government action, is one of the core doctrines of U.S.
constitutional law, and one of the more complex ones. Nothing, then, is naturally private or public, because these categories are derived from a particular and preexisting political philosophy.
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This has political and legal implications. Tushnet argues that the doctrine leaves in place the background rules of contracts, torts, and property, choosing to make actionable only the decisions emanating from these background rules. In that sense it is artificial, because both the background rules and the specific rules are the result of governmental choice. Think, for example, of our property law. There is nothing necessary about designing our property regime so as to allow a person complete control over his property to the detriment of others. But once that rule is in place we cease to question it. We accept it as natural, choosing only to adjudicate specific disputes that arise out of our antecedent commitment to that rule. The state action doctrine attempts to demarcate first order actions from second order choices regarding institutional design; but, again, these are all choices the state makes.
State action, then, is everywhere. It is in the details of specific state activities and it is in the second order choices about how legal regimes will look. The upshot, and problem, is that once we do away with the doctrine, everything is potentially the subject of litigation; particularly, the background rules responsible for wealth distribution.
32 31 Similarly, Thomas Nagel argues that for the state not to act is equivalent to choosing or opting for the state not to act. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 100-101 (1991). Nagel directs this claim to libertarians who hold that certain aspects of the economic system are natural and do not have to be justified. According to Nagel, however, when the state allows a laissez-faire system by deciding to enforce only rights which make such a system possible, the state makes a choice that rewards some and deprives others of what they could have under an alternative system. Tushnet's argument is that the background rules -the ones the courts are reluctant to interfere with -are, in fact, socio-economic rights. When courts employ the state action doctrine they are saying that they will not enforce (or rather refuse to acknowledge) socio-economic rights (the rights dealing with allocation of resources).
The doctrine thus serves to maintain a hard distinction between first and second generation rights. Now, while this may make sense in a jurisdiction that embraces the public/private distinction, there is nothing necessary with this particular conception of constitutional law. Moreover, if this line of thought lies with state action, and if state action is unworkable, then so is the distinction between socio-economic rights and civil and political rights which presupposes government "action".
V. Connecting Weak Form Review with Socio-Economic Rights
The state action doctrine has proven to be less problematic in other jurisdictions, most notably Canada, Germany, and South Africa. Equipped with a social democratic concern for welfare rights, these post World War II constitutions and judiciaries have managed to escape the problem of applying judicial review to socio-economic rights.
They did it either by specifically providing for socio-economic rights in their constitution (South Africa), by interpreting non-constitutional norms with an eye to constitutional values (Germany), by changing the common law to cohere with constitutional values (Canada), and/or by holding the state accountable when it fails to in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white") (Opinion of White, J.). 33 To be sure, there may be social-cultural-expressive reasons why the state action doctrine persists, but they are not analytical. Consequently, traditional judicial deference to legislatures on social and economic issues on grounds of policy, while intervening in civil and political rights such as free speech, may be unwarranted, at least conceptually.
regulate an area which has constitutional implications (Canada At the outset, I believe it is important not to overstate Tushnet's overarching argument. Tushnet himself seems to recognize that a lot depends on his argument working out. 43 Most importantly, it seems to me that it is regime dependent and context specific to a point which may make generalizations difficult. Here is what may seem a trivial point, but should not, I think, be underestimated: For socioeconomic rights to be "strong" in the Tushnetian sense, we need a polity that already possesses an interest in making these rights real, for two reasons. First, there needs to be an active civil society that can complement the work of courts and which will make sure weak remedies turn into real results. Second, for courts to issue even weak remedies there must be some institutional legal willingness on their behalf to do so, as opposed to simply rejecting claims relying on these rights.
Regarding the need for a strong civil society, consider, for example, a situation where a court finds that a privately financed healthcare system violates a constitutional right to health because coverage is denied to those who cannot afford to pay. 44 Rather than devise a complete scheme of healthcare coverage for the poor, the court tells the legislature that the problem of poor people without coverage needs to be addressed and gives it a year to come up with a plan that will meet the constitutional standard.
So far this is in line with weak form review. Now, without an effective civil societyindividuals, politicians, organizations, media -that will continue to push for such a plan, the chances that such a plan will in fact materialize are not clear. 45 This is so because there is no real sanction (other than perhaps public embarrassment) that attaches to the judicial remedy. This enables the legislature to "get away with it". To be sure, the problem of "no sanction" is not confined to weak form review, but its potential does seem to increase there. A possible response could take the following approach: Yes, we need a strong civil society which can mobilize politically, but that is often easier said than done. The hope, then, is that weak form review will be able to contribute to the formation of an engaged citizenry by letting it know that the courts cannot accomplish everything on their own. Here we may think of some sort of tradeoff. Courts will stay out of particular areas, especially when it comes to "policy", leaving more room for the political branches and the people to act. The tradeoff is that in the short run things might not get done as quickly as they might have had had courts been stronger.
Moreover, to the extent socio-economic rights are indeed rights, we are legitimizing a time period (short as it may be), in which these rights are not granted a proper defense once a court has found the government to be in violation of the constitution. In the long run, however, weak form review has an educative value, in that it results in better self-government and a more democratic polity.
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This reading also answers the critique that political actors may at times be comfortable with judicial review because it allows for blame shifting. 47 If the difficult and controversial decisions are made by life tenured judges, the legislator will be relatively immune from public criticism and will be better able to retain her seat.
Weak form review undermines the blame shifting argument, because it forces legislators to make the decisions for which they are democratically accountable.
Paradoxically, then, weak form review may contribute more to maintaining the separation of powers scheme than strong form review, even though the latter provides a clearer demarcation between the branches.
At this point it is important to keep in mind that much in the preceding paragraphs is speculative. Weak form review is a relatively young experiment, and whether it can bring about the changes Tushnet hopes for has yet to be determined decisively. It does seem clear, though, that weak form review needs a hospitable environment in which it can flourish. This does not just mean an engaged citizenry, but also institutional willingness from courts, agencies, and legislatures, to cooperate on these issues in a thoughtful and beneficial manner. I turn now to this issue.
II. The Need for Institutional Willingness
46 That is, if you subscribe to the view that essentially conceptualizes democracy as a majoritarian process. On that view there is something undemocratic about judicial review. Therefore, weakening the institution of judicial review stands to enhance democracy. 47 Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993) (arguing that politicians may call upon the judiciary to address issues they would prefer avoiding because of political repercussions such as voter disapproval).
As I argued above, for socio-economic rights to be strong we need some form of institutional willingness to implement these rights. When Tushnet is writing for an American audience -which is why, I believe, he discusses the state action doctrine in such detail -he is arguing that the traditional American aversion to social welfare rights is unfounded because it relies on an untenable conceptual distinction (public/private, act/omission). However, if that was all there was to it then we would expect that doctrine to dissipate. And yet it hasn't, suggesting that the real impasse is cultural-philosophical rather than legal. 48 This impasse is a view of government as curtailing rights rather than expanding them. In a way, Americans (and this is a generalization of course) are committed to the notion of negative rights much more than positive rights because human flourishing is best achieved with minimal governmental interference. Embracing socio-economic rights also means a commitment to an enlarged role for the government in the public sphere, something which Americans are traditionally wary of. 49 This, then, calls into question the plausibility for weak form review to be implemented wholesale in the U.S. It is perhaps no accident then that the relatively few successes of weak form review in the U.S., such as educational adequacy suits, happen at the state level where constitutions are more malleable, less entrenched and constitute less of a nonnegotiable identity. Moreover, almost all state constitutions contain explicit mentions 48 Tushnet alludes to that. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 177-81. of some socio-economic rights, thus resolving the state action problem. 50 To this we can add that many state judges are elected and may have an incentive to designate a larger role for the political branches so as not to alienate politicians whose support will be needed come election time.
The factor of institutional willingness, which is not strictly a part of judicial review, can be as important as how judicial review will be operationalized. To put it differently, judicial review can shift the order of priorities, making particular issues more salient than others. But getting a particular issue resolved will require the operation of politics. Here courts cannot but rely on the political branches (and by extension on civil society) for realizing the judicial decision.
In his example for weak form review in the U.S., Tushnet discusses educational adequacy suits, where states were found to be violating the state constitutional requirement to provide an adequate education. There have been several lawsuits stemming from such provisions, some successful and some not. cooperation difficult. 52 In particular, certain courts -based on their preexisting political leanings -viewed judicial intervention more favorably than others. In other words, they possessed the institutional willingness needed to carry out such reforms.
Similarly, they needed the cooperation of legislatures and governors to make progress.
To be sure, every court needs the cooperation of other institutions to carry out its decisions. 53 When it comes to socio-economic rights, however, courts will need even more cooperation from other co-equal branches because the nature of these matters is that they require further deliberations and resource allocations. This is, of course, the nature of weak form review that it leaves much to be decided after a court has ruled.
Therefore, as the potential for institutional conflict and constraint grows, the potential failure of such an enterprise grows as well.
The conclusion is that weak form review can accomplish the task that Tushnet For those who express skepticism that such conditions could ever be met, a recent case from the South African Constitutional Court suggests that this is not impossible.
In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township, 58 the City wanted to evict 400 people from their homes, citing unsafe and unhealthy building conditions. Petitioners sought relief citing their constitutional right to housing. 59 Instead of definitively resolving the case, the Constitutional Court took a different path, opting for weak form review. It ordered the parties to engage in meaningful deliberations, something it believed had not been done prior to the eviction requests, "in order to alleviate the plight of the applicants… by making the buildings as safe and as conducive to health as is reasonably practicable". 60 The Court held that if the City is aware that its decision to evict is going to make people homeless, and in so doing impact their constitutional right to housing, then it is, at the least, under a duty to meaningfully engage with the occupiers. The judicially sanctioned "meaningful engagement" led to an agreement that the City would not evict the tenants, that it would renovate the buildings and that it would provide temporary accommodation. The parties also agreed to meet and discuss permanent housing solutions.
The lesson of Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township is important. It demonstrates that weak form review has the potential to induce cooperation between government and the people and the capacity to remove political blockage -here in the area of housing rights -while letting the people fashion their own solutions, leaving the court in a monitoring role. Of course, identifying in advance the types of cases where weak form review will be successful is hard, and perhaps impossible, 61 but the two preconditions I elaborated on -institutional willingness and a strong civil society -seem to be key.
III. Enhancing Popular Democracy -a Constitutional Project in Ideal and
Non-Ideal Theory
Readers of Professor Tushnet's previous work, especially "Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts", 62 might be perplexed when reading "Weak Courts, Strong
Rights". As Frank Michelman noted in his review of that work, "the background preference is for democracy, the immediately implied default position is against 61 A possible explanation to the success of Occupiers as opposed to the relative success of Grootboom is that in Grootboom the problem was on a very large scale -thousands of families in the most desperate condition needing a home, whereas in Occupiers the problem was limited to 400 people. This explanation, however, is not convincing. In Occupiers the Court recognized that there might be 67,000 people living in unsafe conditions in Johannesburg, but that did not affect the remedy. The scale of the problem might be a factor in the success of weak form review, but it does not seem to be decisive. 62 Supra note… here's how we can harness it to our benefit. 72 The way to do this is through weak form review because on the one hand it preserves judicial review, and on the other it "tweaks" it so as to increase the range of democratic possibilities, encourage deliberation, and preserve the ultimate authority over constitutional interpretation with the people -a necessary element of self government.
The second way one can square Tushnet's previous work with this book is by telling a story about how judicial review can develop democratically. Roughly, if the people opt for judicial review then the degree to which it is a counter-majoritarian practice is lessened. But unlike other countries that specifically provide for judicial review, the U.S. Constitution does not. Still, weak form review allows for experimentation with constitutional rights. It enables a back and forth between legislatures, agencies, and the courts until the specific issue has been sufficiently crystallized. 73 This is the dialogic conception of judicial review. Now, if weak form judicial review generates real-time constitutional dialogue then one could argue that it does not raise the same democratic objections because it is the result of deliberations between all branches rather than one branch assuming the role of a final arbiter.
D. Conclusion
Weak Courts, Strong Rights takes an instrumentalist approach to judicial review by arguing that the best way to enforce socio-economic rights may be through weak 72 Again, by benefit I mean if one shares Tushnet's ideological position on judicial review. 73 According to Tushnet, weak form review can be replaced with strong form when enough experience has been accumulated to give us confidence that when the court delivers the final word it will not obstruct the principle of self government. Weak form review accomplishes the right of majorities to enact their will when their enactments comport with a reasonable interpretation of the constitution, even if that interpretation differs from that of the courts. For those among us who look to the courts for large scale societal reform, the message in this book may be disappointing. Tushnet acknowledges that legislatures are imperfect, but then so are courts. More often than not, the two branches will have reasonable disagreements. In bringing about societal reform, however, courts can only play a minor, though important, role. The message in this book is that while courts can have a meaningful and legitimate role in a democratic society, they cannot go at it alone. For the project to succeed we need to immerse ourselves in politics and not just law. Professor Tushnet's thesis will therefore become a reality only when the political branches and the public at large will join the experiment he has outlined. 75 Yuval Eylon and Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review 92 VA. L. REV. 991 (2006) (arguing that the purpose of judicial review is to provide a mechanism of reasoned justification to the citizen who believes his right has been impinged by the state). 76 Indeed, in "Taking the Constitution Away" Tushnet makes the opposite argument.
